Who Are the Recruits?
The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Enlistment, 2003–2005
By Tim Kane, Ph.D.
Center for Data Analysis Report #06-09
October 27, 2006
A pillar of conventional wisdom about the U.S. military is that the quality of volunteers has
been degraded after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples of the voices
making this claim range from the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and New York
Daily News to Michael Moore’s pseudo-documentary Fahrenheit 9/11. Some insist that
minorities and the underprivileged are overrepresented in the military. Others accuse
the U.S. Army of accepting unqualified enlistees in a futile attempt to meet its recruiting
goals in the midst of an unpopular war.
A report published by The Heritage Foundation in November 2005 examined the issue
and could not substantiate any degradation in troop quality by comparing military
enlistees in 1999 to those in 2003. It is possible that troop quality did not degrade until
after the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, when patriotism was high. A common assumption
is that the Army experienced difficulty getting qualified enlistees in 2005 and was subse
quently forced to lower its standards. This report revisits the issue by examining the full
recruiting classes for all branches of the U.S. military for every year from 2003 to 2005.
The current findings show that the demographic characteristics of volunteers have
continued to show signs of higher, not lower, quality. Quality is a difficult concept to apply
to soldiers, or to human beings in any context, and it should be understood here in
context. Regardless of the standards used to screen applicants, the average quality of
the people accepted into any organization can be assessed only by using measurable cri
teria, which surely fail to account for intangible characteristics. In the military, it is
especially questionable to claim that measurable characteristics accurately reflect what
really matters: courage, honor, integrity, loyalty, and leadership.
Those who have been so quick to suggest that today’s wartime recruits represent lesser
quality, lower standards, or lower class should be expected make an airtight case.
Instead, they have cited selective evidence, which is balanced by a much clearer set of
evidence showing improving troop quality.
Indeed, in many criteria, each year shows advancement, not decline, in measurable
qualities of new enlistees. For example, it is commonly claimed that the military relies on
recruits from poorer neighborhoods because the wealthy will not risk death in war. This
claim has been advanced without any rigorous evidence. Our review of Pentagon
enlistee data shows that the only group that is lowering its participation in the military is
the poor. The percentage of recruits from the poorest American neighborhoods (with one-
fifth of the U.S. population) declined from 18 percent in 1999 to 14.6 percent in 2003,
14.1 percent in 2004, and 13.7 percent in 2005.
This report updates the previous Heritage Foundation report, with data on all U.S.
recruits during 2004 and 2005. We introduce the term “wartime recruits” to identify
volunteer enlistees in all branches during 2003, 2004, and 2005. Like the previous report,
[3] the analysis considers the following characteristics:
Household income,
Level of education,
Race/ethnicity, and
Regional/rural origin.
In summary, the additional years of recruit data (2004–2005) support the previous
finding that U.S. military recruits are more similar than dissimilar to the American youth
population. The slight differences are that wartime U.S. military enlistees are better
educated, wealthier, and more rural on average than their civilian peers.
Recruits have a higher percentage of high school graduates and representation from
Southern and rural areas. No evidence indicates exploitation of racial minorities (either by
race or by race-weighted ZIP code areas). Finally, the distribution of household income of
recruits is noticeably higher than that of the entire youth population.
Demographic evidence discredits the argument that a draft is necessary to enforce
representation from racial and socioeconomic groups. Additionally, three of the four
branches of the armed forces met their recruiting goals in fiscal year 2005, and Army
reenlistments are the highest in the past five years. A draft is not necessary to increase
the size of the active-duty forces. Our analysis using Pentagon data on wartime
volunteers effectively shatters the case for reinstating the draft.
Household Income of Recruits
Like their peers in 1999 and 2003, recruits in 2004 and 2005 came primarily from middle-
class areas. Poor areas are proportionally underrepresented in the wartime years (2003–
2005).
The Department of Defense (DOD) does not track family income data for recruits, and
there are no individual income data for enlistees. Military service is the first full-time job
for most of them. We approximate each recruit’s household income by using the median
household income of his or her hometown ZIP code.
Much of the analysis in this paper (including this section) uses five-digit Census ZIP code
tabulation areas (ZCTAs) as the unit of analysis. The Census Bureau uses ZCTAs to
approximate U.S. Postal Service ZIP codes. In most cases, ZCTAs correspond to postal
ZIP codes. For example, Representative Charles Rangel (D–NY), who advocated
reinstating the draft in 2003, resides in the postal ZIP code 10037. The corresponding
five-digit ZCTA 10037, shown in Figure 1, had a 1999 median household income of
$26,561. In 2004, six recruits originated from the area. In 2005, two more recruits from
that ZIP code enlisted.
By assigning each recruit the median 1999 household income for his hometown ZIP code
as determined from Census 2000, the mean income for 2004 recruits was $43,122 (in
1999 dollars). For 2005 recruits, it was $43,238 (in 1999 dollars). These are increases
over the mean incomes for the 1999 cohort ($41,141) and 2003 cohort ($42,822). The
national median published in Census 2000 was $41,994. This indicates that, on aver
age, the 2004 and 2005 recruit populations come from even wealthier areas than their
peers who enlisted in 1999 and 2003.
When comparing these wartime recruits (2003– 2005) to the resident population ages
18–24 (as recorded in Census 2000), areas with median household income levels
between $35,000 and $79,999 were overrepresented, along with income categories
between $85,000 and $94,999. Though the mainstream media continue to portray the
war in Iraq as unpopular, this evidence suggests that the United States is not sending the
poor to die for the interests of the rich.
With the addition of data for the 2004 and 2005 recruits, the quintile trends noted in the
previous report are even more striking. From 2003 to 2005, the representation of the
highest-income quintile rose 0.68 percentage point, from 22.17 percent to 22.85 percent.
As conflict in Iraq continues, youth from wealthy areas continue to volunteer for duty
despite increased risk. Additionally, over the course of these three recruit years,
representation from the poorest quintile has decreased dramatically. The representation
among recruits of the lowest-income quintile fell nearly a full percentage point, from 14.61
percent in 2003 to 13.66 percent in 2005.
This change in proportional representation of areas based on ZCTA median household
income is even more noteworthy when compared to the pre-9/11 recruits in the 1999
cohort, in which 18.6 percent of the recruits came from areas in the wealthiest quintile
and 18.0 percent came from areas in the poorest quintile, indicating underrepresentation
for both the high and low ends of the income distribution.
The top three quintiles increased in representation from 2003 to 2005, and all were
overrepresented in comparison to the Census 2000 population ages 18–24.
Education
Educational achievement is the characteristic most commonly cited as evidence of lower
military standards driven by the Iraq War. While some measures, such as the higher
percentage of Category IV recruits in the Army, are cited, other measures, such as the
higher percentage of Category I recruits, are ignored. In general, the higher quality of
recruits compared to equivalent civilian population has held steady during the war years.
The previous study noted the significant difference between the national recruit high
school graduation rate of 98 percent and the national youth graduation rate of 75
percent. This strong distinction continues among the 2004 and 2005 recruits when
compared to the national educational attainment levels reported by the Census 2004
American Community Survey (ACS).
Given the nature of the military rank structure, most enlisted recruits do not have a
college education or degree. Members of the armed forces with higher education are
more often commissioned officers (lieutenant and above). In 2004, 92.1 percent of active-
duty officer accessions held baccalaureate degrees or higher. From 2000 to 2005,
between 10 percent and 17 percent of active-duty officer accessions held advanced
degrees, and between 35 percent and 45 percent of the active-duty officer corps held
advanced degrees. This indicates that officers continued their education during the
course of their military service.
Many enlisted personnel are drawn to the benefits offered by the armed forces that allow
them to obtain funding for college. In recent years, incentives to join the military have
increased, providing more of the enlisted recruits with additional resources to finance
their education. Although only about 7 percent of recruits for 2003–2005 entered the
military with some college experience, over 11 percent of the 2004 active component
enlisted force had some college experience.
Additionally, in the most recent edition of Population Representation in the Military
Services, the Department of Defense reported that the mean reading level of 2004
recruits is a full grade level higher than that of the comparable youth population. Fewer
than 2 percent of wartime recruits have no high school credentials. Table 2 shows the
breakdown for the educational attainment of the wartime recruit cohorts. The national
high school graduation rate taken from the Census 2004 ACS is 79.8 percent.
In previous years, the Department of Defense adhered to a policy of accepting no more
than 2 percent of recruits scoring in Category IV on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT), the standardized test administered to all recruits to determine eligibility.
Category IV indicates that the individual scored between the 21st and 30th percentiles.
Congress accepted a revised policy of up to 4 percent to allow for flexibility in the current
recruiting market. Despite three of the four branches accepting limited numbers of
Category IV recruits, in November 2005, the media criticized the Army for accepting a
high number of recruits from Category IV.
In fiscal year 2005, 4.4 percent of Army recruits scored in Category IV, and the Army is
optimistic that it will remain within policy guidelines with its recruits for fiscal year 2006.
For the first three quarters of fiscal year 2006 (October 2005–June 2006), 3.4 percent of
Army recruits scored in Category IV. While the Army has been criticized for its AFQT
score policy, only 1.2 percent of Marine Corps recruits for the first three quarters of fiscal
year 2006 scored in Category IV, and the Air Force and the Navy have no such recruits
for this period. In 2005, only 2.2 percent of the recruits from all four branches in fiscal
year 2005 scored in Category IV. By comparison, because the Army does not accept
any recruits below the 21st percentile, the nature of AFQT scoring indicates that 20
percent of the comparable civilian population would score below Category IV.
The policy regarding high school graduation status (or the equivalent) remains stringent
across all four branches of the military. At least 90 percent of recruits must be high
school diploma graduates (which does not include equivalency). Recruit accessions from
the first three quarters of fiscal year 2006 are above this guideline in all branches except
the Army. As of May 2006, 83.1 percent of accepted Army recruits met this requirement,
which is still a greater percentage than the national graduation rate including equiv
alency. Additionally, for fiscal year 2006, the Army is in step with the other three
branches in meeting the overall DOD guideline that more than 60 percent of enlistees
should score above the 50th percentile on the AFQT.
The military defines a “high quality” recruit as one who has scored above the 50th
percentile on the AFQT and has a high school diploma. The percentage of high-quality
recruits has increased from 57 percent in 2001 to 64 percent in 2005 (67 percent in
2004),[10] indicating not only that the military is accepting intelligent and well-educated
recruits, but also that the representation of these recruits has increased strongly since
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
While the military has changed its policies to allow flexibility in recruiting standards, it has
certainly not abandoned them. The current guidelines allow each force the flexibility to
accept recruits who satisfy only one criterion: either a high school diploma or an above-
average score on the AFQT, which is a standard equal to or exceeding the general youth
population.
Race
According to the 2004 Census ACS, 75.6 percent of the national adult population self-
identifies as belonging to the racial category white alone. In both 2004 and 2005, 73.1
percent of recruits were classified as white alone. This indicates a recruit-to-population
ratio of 0.97, with 1.00 indicating an exact proportional representation. (See Table 4.)
Whites are the most proportionally represented racial group among recruits. Excluding
the group of a combination of two or more races, minority representation varies between
being moderately proportional to extremely disproportional. The most overrepresented
group is Native Hawaiian/ Other Pacific Islander, with a ratio of 7.49 in 2005, or an over
representation of 649 percent. The Asian category is the most underrepresented group,
with a ratio of 0.69 in 2005.
Similar ratios appear in the proportional representation of racial groups among Army
recruits in both 2004 and 2005, with the exception that blacks are more proportionally
represented among 2005 Army recruits than they are in the total recruit population. The
change in proportional representation of blacks among military recruits is a notable
change from the 2003 cohort to the 2004 and 2005 cohorts. In the last three quarters of
the 2003 recruit year, blacks were largely overrepresented, with a recruit-to-population
ratio of 1.32 among all recruits and 1.44 among Army recruits. For 2004, these ratios
were 1.19 and 1.17, respectively. In 2005, they were 1.07 and 0.96, respectively, which
indicates that in the past two years of military recruits, the proportion of blacks in the
military approached the proportion of blacks in the population.
The 2005 Army recruit-to-population ratio for blacks is 0.96. Additionally,
they are more proportionally represented in the Army than whites, who have an
Army recruit-to-population ratio of 0.95.
The 100 three-digit[11] ZCTAs with the highest proportion of blacks (in any combination
of other races) according to Census 2000 contained 14.63 percent of the adult
population. The recruits from these areas represent 14.09 percent of the 2003 cohort,
14.14 percent of the 2004 cohort, and 13.37 percent of the 2005 cohort. This indicates
that these areas are not being overtly targeted to enlist large numbers of black recruits.
For these 100 three-digit ZCTAs, the percentage of those who self-identified as black in
any combination in the 2004 cohort (42.94 percent) was almost equal to the percentage
of those who self-identified as white in any combination (45.67 percent).
An accurate ratio of proportionality of Hispanics cannot be determined from the recruit
data for 2004 and 2005 due to the high percentage of recruits who declined to respond.
(See Table 5.) However, when considering only those that did respond, the 2004 recruit-
to-population ratio is 1.09 for Hispanics and 0.99 for non-Hispanics. (See Table 6.) For
2005, these ratios were 1.15 and 0.98, respectively. While this suggests that Hispanics
are overrepresented among recruits, it does not reflect a gross underrepresentation of
non-Hispanics. No evidence suggests that the military is targeting its recruiting efforts to
draw principally from Hispanic areas or to enlist primarily Hispanic youth.
Regional
In reexamining the question of whether the troops originate primarily from rural areas, the
data for 2004 and 2005 indicate the same pattern seen in the 2003 data. As the rural
concentration increases, so does the proportional overrepresentation of recruits when
compared to the population ages 18–24. (See Table 7.)
Additionally, the data for 2004 and 2005 confirm the strong military tradition in the South.
In each year from 2003 through 2005, approximately 38 percent of the U.S. population
resided in Southern states. In 2003, 43.82 percent of military recruits listed Southern
hometowns. Southern representation among recruits remained consistent with 43.49
percent in 2004 and 43.8 percent in 2005. (See Table 8.)
In 2004 and 2005, 29 states were overrepresented among military recruits in comparison
to the general population.[12] (See Table 9.) The top five states with the highest
proportional enlistment ratios for 2004 and 2005 are Montana (1.69, 1.57); Texas (1.34,
1.46); Wyoming (1.44, 1.41); Alaska (1.47, 1.40); and Oklahoma (1.31, 1.37). As
mentioned in the previous report, one might expect states directly affected by the 9/11
terrorist attacks to respond with increased enlistment proportions. However, Virginia and
New York continued to decrease in proportional representation from during 2004 and
2005.
The states with the most positive upward movement in their enlistment ratios from 2003 to
2005 were New Hampshire (+0.13), Texas (+0.12), and Maine (+0.10). The greatest
decreases in enlistment ratios correspond to the District of Columbia (–0.15), Mississippi
(–0.14), and Florida (–0.14). However, in both 2004 and 2005, Florida remained overrep
resented among recruits, with a 2005 recruit-to-population ratio of 1.02. From 2003 to
2005, 26 states had little variation (0.05 or less) in their recruit-to-population ratio.
Conclusion
As support for the war in Iraq has declined, criticism of the war has translated into
criticism of our nation’s troops, at least by way of criticizing the quality of wartime recruits.
The November 2005 Heritage Foundation study found that recruits enlisting at the start
of the war were of high quality and in many respects comparable to the youth population.
This updated report’s examination of three years of wartime recruits shows that recruit
quality has not declined.
The estimate for mean household income of recruits increased every year from 2003
through 2005. The poorest areas continue to be underrepresented, while middle-class
areas are overrepresented. Although the richest income brackets are underrepresented,
the difference between the recruit and population proportions for these brackets is less
than 0.25 percent. Overall, the distribution for recruit household incomes is very similar to
that of the youth population.
The military continues to enforce educational standards in its recruiting process. The
high school graduation rate among recruits is higher than it is among the national youth
population. While the active-duty enlisted ranks have fewer college graduates than the
comparable civilian population, DOD annual updates on population representation
indicate that many who join the military are taking advantage of educational opportunities
while serving and that many others continue their education after completing their
enlistment period.
The enlisted ranks are not disproportionately composed of minorities. Whites serve in
numbers roughly proportional to their representation in the population. While blacks
continue to be overrepresented, their representation has decreased during the wartime
years and is much closer to being proportional in 2005 than it was in 2003. Additionally,
recruiters are not targeting black-concentrated areas in an effort to exploit the black
population.
Wartime recruits come more from rural areas, particularly from the South. However, many
states outside of the South, such as Alaska and Montana, continue to have strong
proportional representation. Areas classified as entirely urban are strongly
underrepresented compared to areas with increased rural concentrations, all of which
were overrepresented.
Overall, the wartime recruits are more similar than dissimilar to their civilian counterparts.
The all-volunteer force displays near proportional representation of income backgrounds.
Whites serve in approximate proportion to their population, although representation of
minority groups varies. Recruits must meet educational standards, and the military
provides resources for furthering education to those who might not otherwise have the
opportunity to attend four-year colleges. Although rural representation is disproportional,
the military offers the opportunity to gain new skills and enter industries that are not
available in rural areas.
With regard to income, education, race, and regional background, the all-volunteer force
is representative of our nation and meets standards set by Congress and the
Department of Defense. In contrast to the patronizing slanders of antiwar critics, recruit
quality is increasing as the war in Iraq continues. Although recent recruiting goals have
been difficult to meet, reenlistment is strong and recruit quality remains high. No evidence
supports arguments for reinstating the draft or altering recruiting policies to achieve more
equitable representation.
Tim Kane, Ph.D., is Director of the Center for International Trade and Economics at The
Heritage Foundation.
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The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Enlistment, 2003–2005
By Tim Kane, Ph.D.
Center for Data Analysis Report #06-09
October 27, 2006
A pillar of conventional wisdom about the U.S. military is that the quality of volunteers has
been degraded after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples of the voices
making this claim range from the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and New York
Daily News to Michael Moore’s pseudo-documentary Fahrenheit 9/11. Some insist that
minorities and the underprivileged are overrepresented in the military. Others accuse
the U.S. Army of accepting unqualified enlistees in a futile attempt to meet its recruiting
goals in the midst of an unpopular war.
A report published by The Heritage Foundation in November 2005 examined the issue
and could not substantiate any degradation in troop quality by comparing military
enlistees in 1999 to those in 2003. It is possible that troop quality did not degrade until
after the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, when patriotism was high. A common assumption
is that the Army experienced difficulty getting qualified enlistees in 2005 and was subse
quently forced to lower its standards. This report revisits the issue by examining the full
recruiting classes for all branches of the U.S. military for every year from 2003 to 2005.
The current findings show that the demographic characteristics of volunteers have
continued to show signs of higher, not lower, quality. Quality is a difficult concept to apply
to soldiers, or to human beings in any context, and it should be understood here in
context. Regardless of the standards used to screen applicants, the average quality of
the people accepted into any organization can be assessed only by using measurable cri
teria, which surely fail to account for intangible characteristics. In the military, it is
especially questionable to claim that measurable characteristics accurately reflect what
really matters: courage, honor, integrity, loyalty, and leadership.
Those who have been so quick to suggest that today’s wartime recruits represent lesser
quality, lower standards, or lower class should be expected make an airtight case.
Instead, they have cited selective evidence, which is balanced by a much clearer set of
evidence showing improving troop quality.
Indeed, in many criteria, each year shows advancement, not decline, in measurable
qualities of new enlistees. For example, it is commonly claimed that the military relies on
recruits from poorer neighborhoods because the wealthy will not risk death in war. This
claim has been advanced without any rigorous evidence. Our review of Pentagon
enlistee data shows that the only group that is lowering its participation in the military is
the poor. The percentage of recruits from the poorest American neighborhoods (with one-
fifth of the U.S. population) declined from 18 percent in 1999 to 14.6 percent in 2003,
14.1 percent in 2004, and 13.7 percent in 2005.
This report updates the previous Heritage Foundation report, with data on all U.S.
recruits during 2004 and 2005. We introduce the term “wartime recruits” to identify
volunteer enlistees in all branches during 2003, 2004, and 2005. Like the previous report,
[3] the analysis considers the following characteristics:
Household income,
Level of education,
Race/ethnicity, and
Regional/rural origin.
In summary, the additional years of recruit data (2004–2005) support the previous
finding that U.S. military recruits are more similar than dissimilar to the American youth
population. The slight differences are that wartime U.S. military enlistees are better
educated, wealthier, and more rural on average than their civilian peers.
Recruits have a higher percentage of high school graduates and representation from
Southern and rural areas. No evidence indicates exploitation of racial minorities (either by
race or by race-weighted ZIP code areas). Finally, the distribution of household income of
recruits is noticeably higher than that of the entire youth population.
Demographic evidence discredits the argument that a draft is necessary to enforce
representation from racial and socioeconomic groups. Additionally, three of the four
branches of the armed forces met their recruiting goals in fiscal year 2005, and Army
reenlistments are the highest in the past five years. A draft is not necessary to increase
the size of the active-duty forces. Our analysis using Pentagon data on wartime
volunteers effectively shatters the case for reinstating the draft.
Household Income of Recruits
Like their peers in 1999 and 2003, recruits in 2004 and 2005 came primarily from middle-
class areas. Poor areas are proportionally underrepresented in the wartime years (2003–
2005).
The Department of Defense (DOD) does not track family income data for recruits, and
there are no individual income data for enlistees. Military service is the first full-time job
for most of them. We approximate each recruit’s household income by using the median
household income of his or her hometown ZIP code.
Much of the analysis in this paper (including this section) uses five-digit Census ZIP code
tabulation areas (ZCTAs) as the unit of analysis. The Census Bureau uses ZCTAs to
approximate U.S. Postal Service ZIP codes. In most cases, ZCTAs correspond to postal
ZIP codes. For example, Representative Charles Rangel (D–NY), who advocated
reinstating the draft in 2003, resides in the postal ZIP code 10037. The corresponding
five-digit ZCTA 10037, shown in Figure 1, had a 1999 median household income of
$26,561. In 2004, six recruits originated from the area. In 2005, two more recruits from
that ZIP code enlisted.
By assigning each recruit the median 1999 household income for his hometown ZIP code
as determined from Census 2000, the mean income for 2004 recruits was $43,122 (in
1999 dollars). For 2005 recruits, it was $43,238 (in 1999 dollars). These are increases
over the mean incomes for the 1999 cohort ($41,141) and 2003 cohort ($42,822). The
national median published in Census 2000 was $41,994. This indicates that, on aver
age, the 2004 and 2005 recruit populations come from even wealthier areas than their
peers who enlisted in 1999 and 2003.
When comparing these wartime recruits (2003– 2005) to the resident population ages
18–24 (as recorded in Census 2000), areas with median household income levels
between $35,000 and $79,999 were overrepresented, along with income categories
between $85,000 and $94,999. Though the mainstream media continue to portray the
war in Iraq as unpopular, this evidence suggests that the United States is not sending the
poor to die for the interests of the rich.
With the addition of data for the 2004 and 2005 recruits, the quintile trends noted in the
previous report are even more striking. From 2003 to 2005, the representation of the
highest-income quintile rose 0.68 percentage point, from 22.17 percent to 22.85 percent.
As conflict in Iraq continues, youth from wealthy areas continue to volunteer for duty
despite increased risk. Additionally, over the course of these three recruit years,
representation from the poorest quintile has decreased dramatically. The representation
among recruits of the lowest-income quintile fell nearly a full percentage point, from 14.61
percent in 2003 to 13.66 percent in 2005.
This change in proportional representation of areas based on ZCTA median household
income is even more noteworthy when compared to the pre-9/11 recruits in the 1999
cohort, in which 18.6 percent of the recruits came from areas in the wealthiest quintile
and 18.0 percent came from areas in the poorest quintile, indicating underrepresentation
for both the high and low ends of the income distribution.
The top three quintiles increased in representation from 2003 to 2005, and all were
overrepresented in comparison to the Census 2000 population ages 18–24.
Education
Educational achievement is the characteristic most commonly cited as evidence of lower
military standards driven by the Iraq War. While some measures, such as the higher
percentage of Category IV recruits in the Army, are cited, other measures, such as the
higher percentage of Category I recruits, are ignored. In general, the higher quality of
recruits compared to equivalent civilian population has held steady during the war years.
The previous study noted the significant difference between the national recruit high
school graduation rate of 98 percent and the national youth graduation rate of 75
percent. This strong distinction continues among the 2004 and 2005 recruits when
compared to the national educational attainment levels reported by the Census 2004
American Community Survey (ACS).
Given the nature of the military rank structure, most enlisted recruits do not have a
college education or degree. Members of the armed forces with higher education are
more often commissioned officers (lieutenant and above). In 2004, 92.1 percent of active-
duty officer accessions held baccalaureate degrees or higher. From 2000 to 2005,
between 10 percent and 17 percent of active-duty officer accessions held advanced
degrees, and between 35 percent and 45 percent of the active-duty officer corps held
advanced degrees. This indicates that officers continued their education during the
course of their military service.
Many enlisted personnel are drawn to the benefits offered by the armed forces that allow
them to obtain funding for college. In recent years, incentives to join the military have
increased, providing more of the enlisted recruits with additional resources to finance
their education. Although only about 7 percent of recruits for 2003–2005 entered the
military with some college experience, over 11 percent of the 2004 active component
enlisted force had some college experience.
Additionally, in the most recent edition of Population Representation in the Military
Services, the Department of Defense reported that the mean reading level of 2004
recruits is a full grade level higher than that of the comparable youth population. Fewer
than 2 percent of wartime recruits have no high school credentials. Table 2 shows the
breakdown for the educational attainment of the wartime recruit cohorts. The national
high school graduation rate taken from the Census 2004 ACS is 79.8 percent.
In previous years, the Department of Defense adhered to a policy of accepting no more
than 2 percent of recruits scoring in Category IV on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT), the standardized test administered to all recruits to determine eligibility.
Category IV indicates that the individual scored between the 21st and 30th percentiles.
Congress accepted a revised policy of up to 4 percent to allow for flexibility in the current
recruiting market. Despite three of the four branches accepting limited numbers of
Category IV recruits, in November 2005, the media criticized the Army for accepting a
high number of recruits from Category IV.
In fiscal year 2005, 4.4 percent of Army recruits scored in Category IV, and the Army is
optimistic that it will remain within policy guidelines with its recruits for fiscal year 2006.
For the first three quarters of fiscal year 2006 (October 2005–June 2006), 3.4 percent of
Army recruits scored in Category IV. While the Army has been criticized for its AFQT
score policy, only 1.2 percent of Marine Corps recruits for the first three quarters of fiscal
year 2006 scored in Category IV, and the Air Force and the Navy have no such recruits
for this period. In 2005, only 2.2 percent of the recruits from all four branches in fiscal
year 2005 scored in Category IV. By comparison, because the Army does not accept
any recruits below the 21st percentile, the nature of AFQT scoring indicates that 20
percent of the comparable civilian population would score below Category IV.
The policy regarding high school graduation status (or the equivalent) remains stringent
across all four branches of the military. At least 90 percent of recruits must be high
school diploma graduates (which does not include equivalency). Recruit accessions from
the first three quarters of fiscal year 2006 are above this guideline in all branches except
the Army. As of May 2006, 83.1 percent of accepted Army recruits met this requirement,
which is still a greater percentage than the national graduation rate including equiv
alency. Additionally, for fiscal year 2006, the Army is in step with the other three
branches in meeting the overall DOD guideline that more than 60 percent of enlistees
should score above the 50th percentile on the AFQT.
The military defines a “high quality” recruit as one who has scored above the 50th
percentile on the AFQT and has a high school diploma. The percentage of high-quality
recruits has increased from 57 percent in 2001 to 64 percent in 2005 (67 percent in
2004),[10] indicating not only that the military is accepting intelligent and well-educated
recruits, but also that the representation of these recruits has increased strongly since
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
While the military has changed its policies to allow flexibility in recruiting standards, it has
certainly not abandoned them. The current guidelines allow each force the flexibility to
accept recruits who satisfy only one criterion: either a high school diploma or an above-
average score on the AFQT, which is a standard equal to or exceeding the general youth
population.
Race
According to the 2004 Census ACS, 75.6 percent of the national adult population self-
identifies as belonging to the racial category white alone. In both 2004 and 2005, 73.1
percent of recruits were classified as white alone. This indicates a recruit-to-population
ratio of 0.97, with 1.00 indicating an exact proportional representation. (See Table 4.)
Whites are the most proportionally represented racial group among recruits. Excluding
the group of a combination of two or more races, minority representation varies between
being moderately proportional to extremely disproportional. The most overrepresented
group is Native Hawaiian/ Other Pacific Islander, with a ratio of 7.49 in 2005, or an over
representation of 649 percent. The Asian category is the most underrepresented group,
with a ratio of 0.69 in 2005.
Similar ratios appear in the proportional representation of racial groups among Army
recruits in both 2004 and 2005, with the exception that blacks are more proportionally
represented among 2005 Army recruits than they are in the total recruit population. The
change in proportional representation of blacks among military recruits is a notable
change from the 2003 cohort to the 2004 and 2005 cohorts. In the last three quarters of
the 2003 recruit year, blacks were largely overrepresented, with a recruit-to-population
ratio of 1.32 among all recruits and 1.44 among Army recruits. For 2004, these ratios
were 1.19 and 1.17, respectively. In 2005, they were 1.07 and 0.96, respectively, which
indicates that in the past two years of military recruits, the proportion of blacks in the
military approached the proportion of blacks in the population.
The 2005 Army recruit-to-population ratio for blacks is 0.96. Additionally,
they are more proportionally represented in the Army than whites, who have an
Army recruit-to-population ratio of 0.95.
The 100 three-digit[11] ZCTAs with the highest proportion of blacks (in any combination
of other races) according to Census 2000 contained 14.63 percent of the adult
population. The recruits from these areas represent 14.09 percent of the 2003 cohort,
14.14 percent of the 2004 cohort, and 13.37 percent of the 2005 cohort. This indicates
that these areas are not being overtly targeted to enlist large numbers of black recruits.
For these 100 three-digit ZCTAs, the percentage of those who self-identified as black in
any combination in the 2004 cohort (42.94 percent) was almost equal to the percentage
of those who self-identified as white in any combination (45.67 percent).
An accurate ratio of proportionality of Hispanics cannot be determined from the recruit
data for 2004 and 2005 due to the high percentage of recruits who declined to respond.
(See Table 5.) However, when considering only those that did respond, the 2004 recruit-
to-population ratio is 1.09 for Hispanics and 0.99 for non-Hispanics. (See Table 6.) For
2005, these ratios were 1.15 and 0.98, respectively. While this suggests that Hispanics
are overrepresented among recruits, it does not reflect a gross underrepresentation of
non-Hispanics. No evidence suggests that the military is targeting its recruiting efforts to
draw principally from Hispanic areas or to enlist primarily Hispanic youth.
Regional
In reexamining the question of whether the troops originate primarily from rural areas, the
data for 2004 and 2005 indicate the same pattern seen in the 2003 data. As the rural
concentration increases, so does the proportional overrepresentation of recruits when
compared to the population ages 18–24. (See Table 7.)
Additionally, the data for 2004 and 2005 confirm the strong military tradition in the South.
In each year from 2003 through 2005, approximately 38 percent of the U.S. population
resided in Southern states. In 2003, 43.82 percent of military recruits listed Southern
hometowns. Southern representation among recruits remained consistent with 43.49
percent in 2004 and 43.8 percent in 2005. (See Table 8.)
In 2004 and 2005, 29 states were overrepresented among military recruits in comparison
to the general population.[12] (See Table 9.) The top five states with the highest
proportional enlistment ratios for 2004 and 2005 are Montana (1.69, 1.57); Texas (1.34,
1.46); Wyoming (1.44, 1.41); Alaska (1.47, 1.40); and Oklahoma (1.31, 1.37). As
mentioned in the previous report, one might expect states directly affected by the 9/11
terrorist attacks to respond with increased enlistment proportions. However, Virginia and
New York continued to decrease in proportional representation from during 2004 and
2005.
The states with the most positive upward movement in their enlistment ratios from 2003 to
2005 were New Hampshire (+0.13), Texas (+0.12), and Maine (+0.10). The greatest
decreases in enlistment ratios correspond to the District of Columbia (–0.15), Mississippi
(–0.14), and Florida (–0.14). However, in both 2004 and 2005, Florida remained overrep
resented among recruits, with a 2005 recruit-to-population ratio of 1.02. From 2003 to
2005, 26 states had little variation (0.05 or less) in their recruit-to-population ratio.
Conclusion
As support for the war in Iraq has declined, criticism of the war has translated into
criticism of our nation’s troops, at least by way of criticizing the quality of wartime recruits.
The November 2005 Heritage Foundation study found that recruits enlisting at the start
of the war were of high quality and in many respects comparable to the youth population.
This updated report’s examination of three years of wartime recruits shows that recruit
quality has not declined.
The estimate for mean household income of recruits increased every year from 2003
through 2005. The poorest areas continue to be underrepresented, while middle-class
areas are overrepresented. Although the richest income brackets are underrepresented,
the difference between the recruit and population proportions for these brackets is less
than 0.25 percent. Overall, the distribution for recruit household incomes is very similar to
that of the youth population.
The military continues to enforce educational standards in its recruiting process. The
high school graduation rate among recruits is higher than it is among the national youth
population. While the active-duty enlisted ranks have fewer college graduates than the
comparable civilian population, DOD annual updates on population representation
indicate that many who join the military are taking advantage of educational opportunities
while serving and that many others continue their education after completing their
enlistment period.
The enlisted ranks are not disproportionately composed of minorities. Whites serve in
numbers roughly proportional to their representation in the population. While blacks
continue to be overrepresented, their representation has decreased during the wartime
years and is much closer to being proportional in 2005 than it was in 2003. Additionally,
recruiters are not targeting black-concentrated areas in an effort to exploit the black
population.
Wartime recruits come more from rural areas, particularly from the South. However, many
states outside of the South, such as Alaska and Montana, continue to have strong
proportional representation. Areas classified as entirely urban are strongly
underrepresented compared to areas with increased rural concentrations, all of which
were overrepresented.
Overall, the wartime recruits are more similar than dissimilar to their civilian counterparts.
The all-volunteer force displays near proportional representation of income backgrounds.
Whites serve in approximate proportion to their population, although representation of
minority groups varies. Recruits must meet educational standards, and the military
provides resources for furthering education to those who might not otherwise have the
opportunity to attend four-year colleges. Although rural representation is disproportional,
the military offers the opportunity to gain new skills and enter industries that are not
available in rural areas.
With regard to income, education, race, and regional background, the all-volunteer force
is representative of our nation and meets standards set by Congress and the
Department of Defense. In contrast to the patronizing slanders of antiwar critics, recruit
quality is increasing as the war in Iraq continues. Although recent recruiting goals have
been difficult to meet, reenlistment is strong and recruit quality remains high. No evidence
supports arguments for reinstating the draft or altering recruiting policies to achieve more
equitable representation.
Tim Kane, Ph.D., is Director of the Center for International Trade and Economics at The
Heritage Foundation.
The Weekly American welcomes your comments. Go to the top of this page and
click on "How To Post Stories & Commentaries".
The Truth About U.S. Military Recruits
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